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A Study in Philosophy and Goals of Science Education 
DALE BUNSEN 
The University of Nebraska 
Omaha 
An inquiry into the philosophical area of any human endeavor results in the 
framing of "why" questions. Why study science at all?, naturally becomes one 
of these questions which has great relevance to the field of science education. 
"How" and "what" questions generally use up most of the science educator's 
time and efforts. This is not an attempt to negate the importance of "how" and 
"what" questions ( they are the stuff of science); rather, it is an attempt to 
determine what the case for science is in our educational process. 
From the very beginning, man, the intellectual, has been wondering. This 
wonder gave rise to concern regarding the explanation of his natural world. 
Early explanations of this natural world often resulted in fantasy, a reliance 
on gods, and a perpetuation of irrational thinking. This type of thinking cer-
tainly cannot be condemned, least of all by anyone who was not there at the 
time. This was their place in time and space, not ours. Even as recent as the 
time of Galileo, when he asked the professors in Florence to look through his 
telescope and to observe for themselves the satellites of Jupiter, "they would 
neither see them nor the telescope" ( 18). Bruno, in 1600, was burned at the 
stake for subscribing to a belief in the infinity of the universe and the possi-
bility of many inhabited worlds. However, these tragic episodes involving 
science and scientists were few compared with tragedies concerning other 
cultural forces, religion, economics, etc. And yet, without the comparable in-
ternal tensions associated with governmental or religious revolution as we 
know it, even science had its own revolution which brought about the modem 
age of science. This age was pushed to the forefront by the likes of individuals 
who firmly believed in the orderliness of nature. Nash says, "One cannot 
progress, or even think of progressing, in scientific understanding if he con-
siders nature ruled by one or more capricious or even actively malevolent 
deities." Or as he quotes Einstein, "The Lord God is subtle, but malicious he 
is not." Huxley, the agnostic and believer in the primary of evidence adds, "A 
moral purpose I see no trace in nature. That is an article of exclusive human 
manufacture." 
Now we must consider that this is the here and now. It is our time and place. 
Science no longer has to beg for public support, financial or otherwise. It is a 
prime force in our entire society. Thus, its obligations are paramount if this. 
position is to result in the common good. 
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A Philosophy of Science Education 
A single broad statement of philosophy is difficult at best, but the one the 
writer will attempt to expand and defend is as follows: "To Provide the Op-
portunity for Scientific Literacy." 
This statement of philosophy will be treated and defended in terms of 
broad goals for science education, the achievement of which should be rele-
vant and contributory to the fulfillment of the philosophy. 
Literacy must be thought of in the fullest sense, from one with the ability 
to read and write to the cultured man of letters. 
Goal Number One: To Advance the 
Individual's Capacity for Rational Thought 
The true "rationalist" or the individual who subscribes completely to "ration-
alism," if science is his particular area of interest, may be just a thought scientist 
or at most a paper scientist. His concern is to appeal to reason. His thoughtful 
reasoning is, of itself, knowledge, superior to and independent of his sense 
perceptions. Thus, we have here a part of science that is not based on obser-
vation. 
Science has as its obligation to make its ideas, phenomena, and the pre-
dictive and "postdictive" results of its theories observable to the human 
senses. This is, specifically, also the obligation of the empiricist and more em-
phatically of the observationalist. This obligation does not necessarily apply to 
the rationalist. "He has the tendency to elaborate theoretical systems without 
much reference to the empirical meaning of concepts" ( 6). 
The rational thinker in science presupposes some prior knowledge. The 
early rational thinker, when asked the question, "If one dropped a light-
weight object and a heavier object from the same height above the earth at 
the same time, which would strike the earth first?", might very well say, "The 
heavier object, of course." This seemed reasonable to him-since all he knew 
was that objects fell toward the earth-and he wasn't particularly interested in 
whether it agreed with his sense observations at all. However, the later rational 
thinker, who now has the knowledge that any force requires an interaction 
between at least two or more objects, and that objects have inertia, might 
reason this way. If there is a gravitational interaction between objects, and in 
this case one object ( the earth) is common to both the light object and the 
heavy object, and if one can apply only as much force on an object as it can 
apply in return, then isn't it possible that there is no more or no less capability 
to counteract the inertial properties of the lighter object than there is on the 
heavier object? Thus, the two objects should strike the earth at the same time. 
Here again the rationalist is not particularly concerned with whether the re-
sults of his thought agree with his sense observations. 
Another example might be concerned with outer space. Since the moon, 
through all its phases, appears the same to the earth-bound observer ( even 
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the rationalist), does this mean that the moon does not rotate on any axis of 
its own? If it does rotate, then both the rationalist and the empiricist ( or ob-
servationalist) will probably agree that it must rotate in such a way that at 
any one time it presents the same observable area to the earth-bound observer. 
However, the side of the moon the earth observer cannot see, whethe! it is 
rotating or not, is unaccountable to the empiricist ( or observationalist) because 
he simply cannot see it. ( With orbiting satellite cameras, his dilemma is now 
resolved.) The rationalist can give thought to this question of whether or not 
the moon rotates on an axis with the following result : If the moon is rotating 
in such a way that it presents the same face to the earth observer, then it must 
be rotating at a relatively constant rate. This can lead him to two possibilities: 
( 1) The moon, from wherever it originated, upon entering the earth's gravita-
tional field had an initial rotational velocity that was of such magnitude 
that it presented the same face to the earth-bound observer. 
(2) The center of the moon's mass is not the same as its geometrical center. 
Thus, between two geometrical halves, there can be a relative difference 
in mass whereby, due to gravitational interaction, the more massive side 
will always be facing the earth. 
If the moon is not rotating on its axis, then it is symmetrical at all points 
because the side or part of a side that the earth-bound observer sees always 
appears to be the same. 
Rational thought alone is valuable, and the discipline of science lends itself 
to this type of inquiry. 
The empiricist and observationalist are both rational thinkers. The true 
rationalist is pointed out here to emphasize his viewpoint that rational thought 
is sufficient, and through this contributes to science. However, he has not 
fulfilled the final obligation of the discipline. As P. W. Bridgeman says, "every 
meaningful scientific term must be either definable exhaustively in terms of a 
specific and unambiguous set of possible operations, or be itself a term de-
noting such an operation" ( 1). 
Goal Number Two: To Advance the Individual's 
Knowledge and Understanding of the Natural Environment 
"Our experience of the physical world, in particular, involves, in our per-
ceptions, an orderliness and a reproducibility without which such experience 
could not be distinguished from fantasy or hallucination" ( 15 ). 
Knowledge and understanding will be dealt with, utilizing two facets of 
science, ( 1) its logical structure and ( 2) its investigative nature and tech-
niques. 
Any disciplinary area of study makes use of its very foundations or funda-
mental theories over and over again. Thus, these foundations are continually 
under test and scrutiny. Philosophically one should ask, why has human en-
deavor progressed to a science, or a disciplined area of study, over the years? 
Presumably, the answer to this is that man simply wants to know. The ques-
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tion, how does science contribute to knowledge and understanding of the 
natural environment?, therefore, will be explored. 
It is the writer's contention that the search for knowledge is common to all. 
Everyone wants to know something; every one wants to know more; everyone 
is glad to have known. The difficulty seems to be in talking about how we 
know. This should not be. "There is always something wrong, if one is strain-
ing to make the commonplace incomprehensible" ( 17). 
Prior to the existence of a "science" as we know it, the age of trial and error or 
empiricism was at the forefront and was, in fact, contributing to the scientific 
body of knowledge. Ancient metallurgical techniques were handed down from 
generation to generation, as were techniques of glassmaking, agriculture, food 
recipes. Even in very recent times, the antiknock gasolines had no theory to 
rely on; success was achieved by trial and error. Nevertheless, successful re-
sults were obtained that contributed to man's knowledge and welfare. How-
ever, generalizations from these trial-and-error procedures and results were 
usually weak and limited. They pertained mainly to the evidence of just the 
one specific case. 
The exact sciences ( physical science) have emerged into some fundamental 
patterns of meanings, whereby these patterns can allow prediction. His-
torically this seems to be the way science matures. They proceed from a 
largely empirical-inductive endeavor to a precise theoretical one. In this 
sense, the biological sciences do not seem as mature. 
The logical structure and investigative nature of science, as they apply to 
the generation of knowledge, are interrelated. Structure implies that some-
thing is constructed in a certain way. Investigation can both inquire into this 
structure, as it has evolved through history, and contribute to its continuing 
evolvement. 
The logical structure of science places reliances on facts, hypotheses, prin-
ciples, generalizations, laws, and theories. While no sharp lines can be drawn 
between these, there are useful distinctions implied by them. "Facts" usually 
refer to particular data of observation. "Hypotheses" are generalizations in 
need of testing by further observations. "Principles" are fundamental ways of 
representing physical processes, suggesting further consequences to be tested 
by experiments and observations. "Generalizations" are hypotheses, whose 
scope of application has been well tested. "Laws" usually refer to generaliza-
tions that have been firmly established and precisely formulated. "Theories" 
are conceptual structures that provide explanations for laws. 
For example, the study of the behavior of gases yields certain observable 
"facts" about . pressure, volume, and temperature. Experiments can be per-
formed to test the "hypothesis" that under constant temperature, when the 
pressure of a given mass of gas is increased, its volume will decre_ase. This 
hypothesis, when confirmed by experiment, becomes a valid "generalization." 
When quantitatively expressed by the mathematical relation PV=K, it quali-
fies as a law (Boyles). The "principle" implied here is that gases may be 
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treated as homogeneous compressible substances, with such measurable prop-
erties as pressure, volume and temperature ( each specified within the experi-
ment). The explanation for Boyles Law ( and others, including Gay-Lussac's 
and Charles's) is provided by a theory ( the kinetic theory of gases), which 
conceptually treats a gas as a collection of perfectly elastic particles in random 
motion. The same chain of knowledge generation can be applied to Mendel's 
observed facts about the patterns of appearances in garden peas, up through 
his laws of hereditary dominance and recessiveness to the theory of genetic 
continuity. 
In order to be predictive, a science must have theory. Boyles Law, if the 
investigation stopped at that point, would be valid only if it were applied to 
each and every gas. However, the kinetic theory explains that Boyles Law must 
be applicable to all gases. Thus, all procedures up to theory may summarize 
or describe, but they do not explain, and thus do not seem to satisfy investi-
gators as they search for basic explanations. As Robinson ( 15) quotes from 
Margenau " ... they feel the urge to probe more deeply, to derive . .. ( these 
uniformities) of experience from principles not immediately given." 
Since science is both theoretical and empirical, the deductions must finally 
be checked against sense observations. This means that science has an obli-
gation to be investigative. 
There are a multitude of ways to investigate in science, none of which 
guarantees success. But one thing is clear, that in order to generate knowledge 
and maintain the dynamic nature of science, we must investigate as Conant 
( 3) indicates: 
The more one studies the steps by which rapid advances have b een made in 
the natural sciences, the more difficult it is to describe the ways in which 
wide generalizations and new concepts have originated. The one thing that 
does seem certain is that one must speak of the ways, for there is no single 
way. This is the reason why it is worse than nonsense to speak of the scientific 
method. 
Some of the investigative processes which are valuable to the scientist and 
to the neophyte studying in the discipline have been outlined by the AAAS 
( 18). These include observation, communication, number relations, classifi-
cation, space/time relations, measuring, predicting, inference, interpreting 
data, formulating models, defining operationally, formulating hypothesis, con-
trolling variables, and experimenting. 
These mental and concrete investigative processes may be analogous to 
one of science's own processes, that of formulating models. All of these 
processes may be thought of as one model whereby one can proceed in 
science education. It is somewhat like a map. A map is a formal representation 
of an area, chosen for the purpose of directing travel in that region. So these 
processes may derive their usefulness in how they direct thought and eventual 
understanding of the natural world. 
Investigation alone is insufficient. A union of rational thought, a knowledge 
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of the logical structure of the sciences, with investigation, is paramount. As 
Phenix ( 13) states, 
The goal of scientific investigation is not the accumulation of particular 
observations, but the formulation and testing of general laws.· To understand 
the methods of scientific inquiry, it is necessary to be clear as to how generali-
zations are obtained from the data of observation . The process is essentially 
indirect. Generalizations are not directly derived from the particulars of observa-
tion by a chain of logical inference. It is truer to say that generalization comes 
first, as an imaginative construction, and that the data of observation are then 
used to validate the generalization. In teaching science the importance of this 
priority can hardly be exaggerated . The student completely misunderstands 
science if he thinks that observations somehow speak for themselves, yielding 
laws and theories by some straightforward process of reasoning from the data of 
sense to the general propositions of science. 
Hawkins goes on to say, 
Our understanding of things is attributive: the nature of anything is not 
merely a summary, but an explanation, of its natural behavior; the thing be-
haves as it does because it has such a nature rather than some other. 
Goal Number Three: To Advance the Individual's 
Control Over His Conduct in a Civilized Environment 
The crucial problem in civilization, as we know it, is man's behavior toward 
his fellow man. Science cannot divorce itself from this problem since man, as 
a biological entity, cannot isolate himself but must somehow exist alongside 
other human beings. 
We have to face first and foremost what is probably the chief anxiety now 
existent about the progress of science, namely, that it is giving man enmmously 
increased power over his physical environment without at the same time con-
ferring on him the wisdom to use this power for the well-being instead of the 
ha1m of his fellow human beings ( 11) . 
Scientists and nonscientists alike are becoming increasingly concerned with 
this cultural lag. In these times, there is a very definite sociological aspect of 
science, namely, cooperation in large-scale research programs, publication of 
research results, methods of scientific information retrieval, administration of 
funds for research projects and research fellowships, communicating the sig-
nificance of science to the general public, etc. Obviously, scientist meets with 
scientist in all of these activities . However, the scientist must also deal with 
the nonscientist, mainly to convince him of the importance of science. 
It is assumed that the scientist, by virtue of his profession, deals with his 
fellow man in accordance with a high moral tone and strict ethical principles. 
Whether he does this in actuality is always open to argument. However, 
scientists, like other human beings, must follow some rules of conduct to 
prevent them from b eing chaotic. In stable societies, these rules of conduct 
are usually held relatively constant by custom, and with continual refinement 
become codes of ethics. 
Thus, what does science have to do with conduct or codes of ethics? Science 
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is concerned with the search for truth and fact, or "what is," rather than "what 
ought to be." There is the dilemma of human behavior and life itself. All life 
lives at the expense of other life. Even the vegetarian penalizes the animal 
by eating part of his food supply. The "will to live" seems to imply some un-
avoidable cruelty. This is evidenced by population controls, especially in im-
poverished communities, legalized abortion, the eradication of living organisms 
causing disease and savagery within the human race during wars, all of which 
display a great deal of cruelty while exercising the will to live. Fortunately or 
unfortunately, science has made great contributions to the sophistication of 
this inherent cruelty in man's need to survive, and will continue to do so. 
What then can science do to contribute to the conduct of man in his civilized 
environment? 
"Man in his better moments seems to exemplify a senseless urge to force 
some order on his experience. The very existence of science is an example of 
this" ( 11). Science, through the self-evident truths of its axiom and somewhat 
more speculative assumptions of its postulates, continues then with its deduc-
tions to predict, infer, and conclude that certain things are indicative rather 
than imperative statements. Ethics, on the other hand, is vitally concerned 
with imperatives or commands concerning human beings, i.e., the human being 
ought to do so and so. The Golden Rule and the Ten Commandments are 
examples of imperatives that could be thought of as ethical laws. Our legal 
system, concerned as it is with the implications and actual practice of this 
theory, might be considered the ethical engineering portion. If science is to 
contribute to human conduct, then its concern might be to look for parallels 
or analogies within the scientific realm which may serve as imperatives re-
garding the human race, from which logical deductions may be drawn con-
cerning human behavior. 
Lindsay ( 11) and other scientists and philosophers of science have proposed 
a thermodynamic imperative as an ethical theory to which science contributes. 
This is based upon the first and second laws of thermodynamics. The first 
law states, in effect, that the total amount of energy stays constant. Again, 
some form of energy is always associated with an equivalent, corresponding 
loss, someplace. Thus, as far as energy is concerned, there is no way of getting 
something for nothing. The second law states that entropy ( state of lowest 
energy or maximum disorder) cannot decrease by itself. It either increases or 
stays the same. Every time we decrease entropy we do so at the expense of 
energy. 
The thermodynamic imperative states that through thought and behavior 
man should conduct himself so as to continually decrease or consume entropy. 
This means that he continually strives for maximum order rather than dis-
order. Man's institutions are examples of adherence to this imperative. Our 
educational systems, our legal structure, our government, our social institutions 
reflect this entropy-consuming tendency. There are numerous other behaviors 
of man that do not reflect this tendency, such as war, crime, alcoholism. . . . 
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The human organism, itself, seems to violate the second law of thermodynam-
ics in that it is an ordered and an order-seeking entity. Thus, one might say, 
why not produce all the human life possible? This may happen, however, 
since we still have to obey the first law of not being able to get something for 
nothing, it seems to violate the imperative in that it is a disordered way of 
producing order. What this imperative asks is that the individual do all in his 
power to add to this order rather than subtract from it. This places a very 
heavy responsibility on the talented person, since he may be either a great 
consumer or producer of entropy. Therefore, the thermodynamic imperative 
applies to the individual, and he must be free to obey it or disobey it as he 
sees fit. 
The development of science is imbedded in the social makeup of the world. 
Thus, it does impose its methods, inferences, predictions . . . on society1 
while the rest of society imposes its cultural patterns upon the sciences in a 
cyclic process. Science must contribute its share in the way of thought and 
technique to the continued quest for maximum order in our civilized environ-
ment, and to decreasing the gap between our technological advances and our 
cultural advances. 
Goal Number Four: To Advance {he 
Individual's Capacity for Productive Imagination 
We cannot be taught imagination, but education must either expand or 
contract the native imaginative capacity of the individual. Thus, it appears 
that if we cannot be taught imagination, we really don't know what imagina-
tion is or what causes it. In terms of expanding or contracting the individual's 
native capacity for imagination, confinement to what imagination does and 
what science offers toward influencing its expansion or contraction appears 
to be the most fruitful procedure. 
The observable characteristics in children, such as their fantasies, inatten-
tiveness, dreaming ( both day and night) , and their unreal conceptions of the 
world, are often thought to be imaginative- and they are. However, these 
characteristics of imagination are of no real value to science. This is not to say 
that they are of no real value to the student. Almost every adult wishes that 
we could recapture some of these youthful capabilities, and he often does so 
when, during sleep, inhibitions disappear and he dreams. These are almost 
cathartic, and as such are of real value. However, the waking youthful fantasies 
or free-ranging imagination are of no use to science. Knowing too little and 
accepting too much, the child fails to discriminate between worthwhile, imag-
inative ideas about things as they are or might be and other ideas that are not. 
Supposedly, the educated man has this facility for critical discrimination, but 
he often pays a high price. Imaginative thought patterns may never occur to 
him or, if they do, they are pushed aside by his "critical thought" -processes 
that have been so firmly established. As Nash ( 12) says, "Indeed a difficult 
feat, apparently rarely accomplished, is the acquisition of knowledge and 
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discipline without loss of essentially all of the child's facile capacity for seeing 
the familiar in unfamiliar ways." 
The expansion of productive imagination within a student can and should 
be achieved through his encounters with science. This achievement is felt to 
be the responsibility of many of the new science curriculum projects. As 
Karplus ( 9) states, "The Science Curriculum Improvement Study may also 
shed some light on the acceptance by school systems and their communities of 
an educational program designed to create inquisitiveness, mental flexibility, 
and intellectual independence." 
In the operation of science, we see that the scientist makes an observation 
and describes the reality he perceives. His imagination seems to direct him to 
look for regularity. For example, a scientist observed that some objects were 
heavier than others. H e collected more data and looked for regularity until he 
found a pattern of direct relationship between volume and weight. His find-
ings showed that, with this particular substance, if he increased its volume 
he increased its weight. Now, his imagination apparently produced a union 
or synthesis that some unit weight had some unit volume, and that this was a 
fundamental property of this substance. Proper experiences in science, prop-
erly introduced, can allow the imagination to expand and thus incorporate the 
new relationship of weight and volume into the individual's mental framework. 
In order to facilitate this expansion of productive imagination most effec-
tively, the teacher must recognize that science and science teaching needs to 
be approached in a fashion that will allow it to be realized. This will be 
treated under Goal Number Six. 
Goal Number Five: To Foster and Advance the Individual's Attitude of 
Friendly Skepticism Toward Outside Influences, Scientific and Nonscientific 
The age of now is filled with many conveniences and, in some cases, un-
wanted complexities that have been brought to fulfillment by science and its 
associated technology. A climate of friendly skepticism-possibly healthy con-
servatism-appears to have merit as a public attitude. Quoting Roberts, "To 
live comfortably with science it is necessary to live with a dynamically chang-
ing system of concepts. It is necessary to live with enough conservatism to 
resist the easy abandonment of concepts, but enough flexibility to be able, 
when necessary, to switch rather than fight" ( 14 ). 
The scientific community has long recognized and assumed its responsibili-
ties for dispassionate inquiry; for responsibility to publish its findings such 
that knowledge becomes the property of all; for the rigorous subjection of its 
new knowledge to debate an objective criticism. Scientists, when they are en-
gaged in science, are rational people. As they search for clues and answers, 
they reject these clues or answers unless they find support through empirical 
data. They cannot allow prejudice or bigotry to influence their results. Scien-
tists were not born this way; they took a long time learning. 
Some of these characteristics of the scientific community should be carried 
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into nonscientific areas by the insistence of scientists and by the teaching of 
science to our youth. As the pressures of social, economical, political, educa-
tional ... problems continue to increase, the need to attack these problems 
with controlled emotion and rationality also increases. In this age of fantastic 
mobility, extremely efficient communication, energy sources that can be ulti-
mately destructive, and overpopulation bring with them problems that simply 
cannot be ignored, because they will not go away. It seems rather irrational 
to leave attempts for solution of these problems to chance. It is also evident 
that many of our problems will be attacked emotionally; however, these solu-
tions can be dangerous and at best short-lived. Lawson states, 
It is probable that the transfer of rational behavior from science to non-
scientific areas will not occur solely on the basis of learning science, but it is 
certain that such transfer will not occur if children have no contact with science 
at all (IO). 
Science must not and, to this writer, will not eliminate the "humanness" 
from our culture. However, if science is to contribute to the management of 
our human problems, the climate of the scientific community needs to be 
transmitted to more people. In a climate where things are not taken for 
granted, there is an aversion to superstition; freedom of inquiry is first and 
foremost. 
Goal Number Six: To Foster and Advance the Individual's 
Realization That Science is a Human and Knowable Endeavor 
At one time, science was thought to be a static, fixed collection of facts or 
truths about our world that were produced by somewhat peculiar people 
called scientists. This placed the body of scientific knowledge in a category 
like a stamp collection, systematically cataloged. The scientist operated some-
thing like a camera that takes pictures of what exists. After the pictures are 
taken, they become natural history. The scientist arranges his natural history in 
an order that exists in nature and that he can perceive. 
If this is science, then the teaching of science can be merely one of relating 
these natural historical facts and be done with it. However, modern under-
standing of science rejects this idea and, instead, recognizes that what a 
scientist ( or anyone) observes depends as much on his past experiences and 
conceptual framework as on what he observes. It recognizes that some ideas 
are better than others, because they explain or account for the phenomena 
with more meaning. It also recognizes that these ideas are products of man's 
invention imposed by him upon the empirical facts of the world. They also 
represent nothing more than the best approximation he can make at that time. 
It follows that the more man knows about his world the better approximations 
he can make, and the more precise his predictions about future events_ may be. 
This leads us to the approach of science teaching. A student seems to be 
involved in science by any or all of four levels. The first, and least effective, is 
reading about or being told about science. The second includes teacher-pupil 
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and pupil-pupil discussions about science. These levels are largely abstract and, 
especially in the case of elementary students, understanding is limited to the 
student's ability to understand the printed or spoken word and to the verbal 
expression of his ideas. The student is involved on a third level, when the 
teacher or another student conducts a demonstration with science equipment 
or materials. This is somewhat more effective in communicating ideas about 
science, except that the noninvolved student usually reacts passively to the 
demonstration. The fourth level finds the individual confronting the materials 
and phenomena he is studying. He manipulates the materials, observes, inter-
acts, fails, succeeds, becomes frustrated, but is involved in his own way. His 
findings are his own and are determined by what he does. Consequently, he 
at least experiences science firsthand. Here is where he has the best oppor-
tunity to realize that science is human and knowable. 
Summary 
The study of philosophy regarding science and science education suggests 
that there are many implications for teachers if we are to impart this endeavor 
to our youth. The teacher must spend a great deal of time listening to students 
and observing their work on the highest level of scientific involvement. The 
teacher needs to develop his ability to ask questions which intensify the stu-
dents' interest. The teacher must accept the students' response as being 
worthy, and not stifle it because it is not the specific response of which the 
teacher is thinking. He must develop the ability and desire to accept students' 
answers as evidence of their observation or understanding of the situation 
being examined. This means that the prospective teacher should spend his pre-
service training in situations that develop these characteristics. The teacher 
without these preservice experiences will not develop them upon accepting 
his first teaching position. It has been said many times that "you can't teach 
something you don't know" and by the same token one can hardly expect 
pupils to learn attitudes that their teachers don't have. 
In our science classes we must insist that the instructional materials and 
teaching strategies reflect completely the spirit of the discipline that we teach. 
By that it is meant that science education must embody continual inquiry, free 
investigation, and the allowance of students to be responsible for their own 
progress. They deserve a chance to succeed, to fail, to blindly stumble around 
and finally to find the necessary impetus to regroup and proceed forward or 
backward again. This is the way education is and we ought not pretend other-
wise. 
There is no one way to develop scientific literacy. However, education needs 
to provide the opportunity to look continually for the ways so that the nature 
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